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After-Acquired Income and Contributions by 
Australian Bankrupts: Can Pay, Should Pay, 
Making Them Pay! 
 
CHRISTOPHER SYMES & MARK WELLARD 
 
This article explores the issue of income of bankrupts from the historical, theoretical 
and legislative viewpoints.  After setting out the foundation for our present law, the 
article reviews the current statistics on the use of the existing legislative income 
contribution regime and analyses the jurisprudence which has made the notion of 
after-acquired income - and the ability of bankrupts to invest it - opaque.  The article 
then canvasses the ‘can pay, should pay’ notion of income contributions by bankrupts 
together with the current debate on ‘making them pay’. 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the distinguishing features of personal insolvency is that it always 
contemplates the ongoing financial life of the bankrupt.  Central to this are the rules 
providing for exempt property and the encouragement to continue in employment to 
advance the well-being of the individual bankrupt and his/her dependents.  A 
bankrupt’s life continues despite his/her bankruptcy and therefore bankrupts have the 
basic needs to provide themselves and their dependents shelter and food.  These needs 
are met either by the bankrupt collecting social security benefits (due to 
unemployment or disability) or by employed bankrupts earning an income.  It is in 
respect of such ‘income’ that Australian bankruptcy trustees are required to make a 
contribution assessment.  After-acquired income, so called because it is acquired 
following the commencement of bankruptcy, will be present throughout the period of 
bankruptcy.  Such income assumes an important role in a bankruptcy administration 
due to the imposed legislative requirement and expressed object of requiring a 
bankrupt to pay contributions.  From the existence of this after-acquired income 
comes the expectation that a contribution to creditors may be possible. 
 
The present Australian approach is to permit the trustee-in-bankruptcy to determine 
the amount of after-acquired income that will form a contribution to creditors and the 
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legislation sets out the several matters that assist in making the determination.  This 
appears to be a preferred approach to that of requiring the trustee to apply to court for 
an order with respect to the amount of income that must be contributed to the 
bankrupt’s creditors (as in the UK).     
 
Australia’s current income contribution regime for bankrupts commenced in 1992 and 
was introduced to address “expressions of concern in the community that legislative 
measures should be taken to make [the mechanisms for obtaining income 
contributions] … more effective, but not in such a way as to operate to the 
disadvantage of persons with low incomes.”1  Does this aspect of Australia’s 
bankruptcy law currently steer the right course between the two (generally 
denounced) outcomes of bankrupt ‘slavery’ on the one hand and the lack of reciprocal 
responsibility on the other?  The analysis which follows is an attempt to shed some 
light on this question by exploring and considering the historical, theoretical and 
statistical perspectives on Australia’s income contribution regime as well as the key 
cases in which courts have had to apply and/or construe the critical provisions of the 
relevant legislation. 
 
II THE HISTORY OF INCOME CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
The concept of after-acquired property and income from bankrupts has a long history 
in Britain.  Legislation in 1849 expressly provided that property may ‘revert, descend, 
be devised or bequeathed or come to’ a bankrupt and will vest in the estate.  1869 
legislation provided that where a bankrupt ‘was in receipt of salary or income … the 
court on application of the trustee could make such orders as it thought just.’  Both 
these provisions found their way into the 1883 legislation and were later translated 
into the UK’s Bankruptcy Act 1914.  
 
When the Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth) was drafted it contained the following 
provision:  
101 Subject to this Act, where a bankrupt is in receipt of pay, pension, salary, 
emoluments, profits, wages, earnings, or income, the trustee shall receive for 
                                                 
1 Explanatory Memorandum, Bankruptcy Amendment Bill 1991, 2 [2].  
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distribution amongst the creditors so much thereof as the Court, on the application of 
the trustee, directs.     
 
While UK case law suggested that whatever property the bankrupt acquires before 
discharge ‘belongs’ to the trustee ‘save only what is necessary for his support’, an 
Australian court rejected this interpretation of income vesting in the trustee for the 
purposes of s 101, as did the Clyne Committee in 1962.2 The Clyne Committee 
suggested the section be recast so that, subject to any order of the court, a bankrupt 
who was in receipt of income should be entitled to retain it for their own benefit.  
 
The 1966 legislation took on board the Clyne Committee’s suggestion to recast the 
provision.  Section 131(1) provided that a person who became bankrupt was entitled 
to retain his income for his own benefit and ‘income’ was to be interpreted widely. As 
Rose commented ‘no formula can be given to determine its precise scope’.3    
 
In 1992 amending legislation was inserted into the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (‘the 
Act’) the current Division 4B, entitled ‘Contribution by bankrupt and recovery of 
property’ and this includes the statement of objects in s 139J. Importantly, after-
acquired income does not vest in the trustee.4  
 
  
III THE THEORETICAL OBJECTIVES 
 
One of the objects of Division 4B of Part VI of the Act is to require a bankrupt who 
derives income during the bankruptcy to pay contributions towards the bankrupt’s 
estate.  We know this because s 139J(a) expressly mentions it.  This particular 
division has been described by the Federal Court as one that ‘approaches a code’ for 
dealing with after-acquired income of a bankrupt.5   
 
                                                 
2 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Official Receiver (1956) 95 CLR 300, Committee appointed by 
the Attorney General of the Commonwealth to Review the Bankruptcy Law of the Commonwealth 
1962 (Clyne Committee) para 197-201. 
3 D J  Rose, Lewis Australian Bankruptcy Law (8th ed 1984) 150. 
4 Re Gillies; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1993) 42 FCR 571; 115 ALR 631, 576-577, [11] 
(French J). 
5 Ibid. 
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To achieve this object it has been necessary to have provisions which permit the 
trustee to make an assessment of the contribution expected from the bankrupt and 
several determinations such as whether the bankrupt has received reasonable 
remuneration in respect of employment or from any transaction entered into during 
the assessment period.  Persons other than the bankrupt (including the bankrupt’s 
employer) can be required to make payments in order to achieve the same stated 
object.   
 
Insolvency laws aim to be efficient, fair and accountable and arguably, even some 
specific provisions will deter.6  The income ‘code’ certainly ticks some of these 
boxes.  Firstly, the provisions provide for a formula that aims to calculate efficiently 
just how much the income contribution will be.  Secondly, the very fact that a 
bankrupt can keep income from his or her employment suggests an attempt at 
achieving fairness between the creditors (who are suffering some shortfall in their 
lawful claims) and the bankrupt’s attempt at a fresh start and the need to have some 
money to live.  Thirdly, the code is quite detailed in making the bankrupt accountable 
for the income and it specifically targets others associated with the bankrupt who are 
corralled into paying the earnings or to make transfers direct to the trustee in lieu of 
the bankrupt.  Fourthly, there is a clear association with some of the offences found in 
Part XIV of the Act with express terms of imprisonment that serve to deter non-
compliance with the ‘code’.   
 
In his book The Ethics of Bankruptcy Kilpi makes a link between discharge and 
income contributions, stating that, along with the exempt property rules, these income 
contributions expectations are matters ‘of community judgment relative to community 
standards’ provided they remove the threat of debt bondage.7  Later he proffers a 
justification for income orders. His preamble though is insightful: 
 
Even if one is happy to accept that income orders may be enforced to satisfy the 
creditors, it should be borne in mind that honest debtors, those who sincerely have 
sought to pay their debts, have not committed a moral wrong deserving of 
                                                 
6 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge University Press, 
2nd ed, 2009). 
7 Jukka Kilpi, The Ethics of Bankruptcy (Routledge, 1998) 87. 
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punishment, nor would it be beneficial to punish them. The justification of income 
orders can come only from the monetary gain to the estate.8  (emphasis added) 
 
So if we accept this justification, the present Division 4B of Part VI of our bankruptcy 
legislation should be written to increase the distributions to creditors and not to 
provide punishment or hardship to the bankrupt.  
 
IV THE CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the amending legislation in 1992 explained that the 
earlier provisions, requiring a trustee to approach the court for orders with regard to 
after-acquired income, ‘had not been a particularly useful instrument for trustees 
because of the cost of court process and the self-defeating nature of the custodial 
sanction for non-compliance with the order.’  The Explanatory Memorandum also 
referred to bankrupts who earned large incomes and for all practical purposes were 
not required to make any repayments and that the new ‘code’ was clearly being 
introduced to amend that situation.   
 
Division 4B of Part VI of the Act requires that a bankrupt who derives income above 
a specified amount - a formula is contained in s 139S – during the period of their 
bankruptcy will pay a contribution towards the bankrupt estate.  There is a threshold 
point at which the bankrupt becomes liable to pay and this is determined by reference 
to the pension rate in the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) and is increased having 
regard to the Consumer Price Index.  The minimum income for compulsory 
contributions is referred to as the base income threshold amount (‘BITA’) with 
appropriate increases to this amount where the bankrupt has dependants.  As at 20 
March 2014 the BITA was $52,543.40 (net of tax).9  A bankrupt's income is assessed 
against the BITA every 12 months in order to determine the liability to make 
contributions. 
 
To make the income contribution regime work effectively, Division 4B also contains: 
                                                 
8 Ibid 147. 
9 Sourced from AFSA’s website at http://www.afsa.gov.au/resources/fact-sheets/indexed-amounts.  
The limits are updated twice a year on 20 March and 20 September.  
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 provision for the assessment of deemed reasonable remuneration in 
circumstances where a bankrupt is working but not receiving the level of 
remuneration one would expect for that kind of employment (s 139Y of 
the Act); and 
 ‘garnishee’ provisions which empower the Official Receiver (either as 
trustee or upon application by a registered trustee) to require employers (or 
debtors) of bankrupts to make payments of wages or debts directly to 
trustees in bankruptcy (Subdivision I of Division 4B of the Act). 
 
The interaction of these two aspects of the income contribution regime will be 
discussed further below.  
 
There is also a supervised account regime which essentially operates to provide 
trustees with the means to police and enforce the contribution obligations of a 
defaulting bankrupt (Subdivision HA of Division 4B of the Act).10 
 
V  THE PRESENT POSITION FROM A STATISTICAL VIEWPOINT 
 
The Annual Reports and Selected Statistics on Personal Insolvency released by ASFA 
(formerly ITSA)11 present quite detailed information (in the form of tables) regarding 
the contributions made from income by bankrupts and other related matters. AFSA’s 
Selected Statistics on Personal Insolvency in 2012-13 (‘the 2012-13 AFSA 
Statistics’)12 feature a key table in this regard: it provides the number of bankruptcies 
in which contributions were paid (including voluntary contributions) and the amounts 
contributed including a breakdown of those numbers according to the type of trustee 
(Table 3).  Table 3 also provides a state-by-state breakdown of the bankruptcies in 
which contributions were paid and the amounts contributed.  It is perhaps instructive 
at the outset to compare the amount of bankruptcies in which contributions were paid 
                                                 
10 The supervised account regime may only apply to a bankrupt who has defaulted at least once in 
respect of a contribution obligation: s 139ZIC(2) of the Act. 
11 On 15 August 2013 ITSA changed its name to the Australian Financial Security Authority (‘AFSA’).  
From 2012-13 AFSA has adopted the practice of publishing its range of personal insolvency statistics 
on its website earlier than its Annual Report.  
12 Released on 15 October 2013 and available on AFSA’s website at 
https://www.afsa.gov.au/resources/statistics/selected-statistics/selected-statistics. 
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against the total number of new bankrupts in 2012-13: ie, 7,432 such bankruptcies 
against a total of 20,875 ‘new bankrupts’.13  
In terms of Official Trustee administrations, the observable trend over the last three 
years appears to be a decrease in both contributors and aggregate contributions (ie, 
$11.9 million from 3,121 ‘contributors’ in 2010-11, $11.2 million from 2,634 
bankruptcies in 2011-12 and $9.6 million from 2,382 bankruptcies in 2012-13).14  It is 
concerning that recovered contributions appear to be falling - the reasons given in the 
ITSA Annual Report 2011-12 are that there has been an increase in debt agreements 
and the division of appointments between official and registered trustees. 
In terms of the overall level of contributions, around $45.1 million was contributed 
from 6,921 bankruptcies in 2011-12 which was an increase of $8 million on 2010-
2011.15  The 2012-13 AFSA Statistics appear to reinforce this upward trend by 
reporting $48.8 million of contributions from 7,432 bankruptcies in 2012-13.  There 
were 2,382 bankruptcies administered by the Official Trustee in which income 
contributions totalling $9,622,950 were made (an average contribution of $4,040), 
while there were 5,050 bankruptcies administered by registered trustees which saw 
contributions totalling $39,208,718 (an average contribution of $7,764).  The total 
number of bankruptcies in which contributions were paid was therefore 7,432 against 
a total population of bankrupts of between 27,527 and 28,304 in 2012-13.16  This 
would indicate that approximately 26%-27% of bankrupts were contributing income 
towards their estate.  As mentioned above, the 2012-13 AFSA Statistics also facilitate 
a state-by-state assessment of collections performance.  The average registered trustee 
administration contributed $7,781 in New South Wales/ACT, $6,963 in Queensland 
and $8,274 in South Australia/NT, while the average official trustee administration 
                                                 
13 Figures sourced from Tables 1 and 3, AFSA Selected Statistics on Personal Insolvency in 2012-13, 3 
and 6.  According to Table 1 (Personal Insolvency Activity) there were 20,875 new Part IV and Part XI 
Bankruptcies in 2012-13.  The figure of 7,432 is the aggregate of 2,382 Official Trustee-administered 
bankrupts and 5,050 registered trustee-administered bankrupts (see Table 3).    
14 Figures sourced from ITSA Annual Report 2011-12, Table 15 (Contributions), 40 and AFSA 
Selected Statistics on Personal Insolvency in 2012-13, Table 3, 6.   
15 See AFSA Selected Statistics on Personal Insolvency in 2012-13 (Table 3), 6 and ITSA Annual 
Report 2010-2011.  
16 Numbers of Official Trustee and registered trustee administrations (Part IV and Part XI bankruptcies) 
‘on hand’ at year-start and year-end sourced from Tables 21 and 22, ITSA Annual Report 2012-13, 74-
75. 
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contributed $4,659 in New South Wales/ACT, $3,954 in Queensland and $2,963 in 
South Australia/NT.17  
In the ITSA Annual Report for 2011-12 there is a table showing the number of 
reviews of contribution assessments made by either the Official Trustee or a 
registered trustee (Table 8).  Table 8 records the reviews of income contribution 
assessments conducted under the Act.  The table indicates that in 2011-12 there were 
34 bankrupts who appealed against their income assessments and that around half of 
those who appealed against registered trustee assessments had their contribution 
varied.  One can only speculate as to why decisions by registered trustees would be so 
wayward, if they were indeed wayward.  However, if the total number of 
‘contributing bankrupts’ is 6,923 then the proportion of those seeking reviews is less 
than 1%.18  
 
As the 2012-13 AFSA Statistics suggest, bankrupts who are not compelled to make an 
income contribution under the Act can still voluntarily contribute from their income.  
The 2012-13 AFSA Statistics do not identify the numbers who do, or the amounts that 
are contributed towards creditors in this manner.19  Even those bankrupts who are 
compulsorily required to contribute could always make a contribution in excess of the 
s 139S formula amount.  Again, there is no identification as to what extent this occurs 
if at all.  
 
VI   THE FOG OF CASE LAW ON INCOME CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
The Australian jurisprudence on income contributions could be best described as 
‘opaque’.  The cases can be split into two major categories, those which consider the 
conversion of ‘after-acquired income’ into ‘after-acquired property’ and those in 
which the court has had to grapple with the question of just what constitutes ‘income’.  
 
A Recent cases on ‘after-acquired income’ converted 
to ‘after-acquired property’ 
                                                 
17 AFSA Selected Statistics on Personal Insolvency in 2012-13 (Table 3), 6. 
18 The AFSA/ITSA Annual Report for 2012-2013 contains only one relevant table to this topic, 
Reviews of Income Contribution Assessments and it reveals similar data to the 2011-2012 Report with 
an almost identical number of reviews received and again around half having their contribution varied. 
See page 91.   
19 This is a deficiency in the published statistics in the authors’ opinion. 
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1   Rodway v White20  
  
William Rodway (a bankrupt) earned $155,440 income over two years during his 
bankruptcy and in compliance with ss 139P to 139ZP of the Act (Division 4B) he paid 
income contributions on this amount.  With the income he was entitled to keep, the 
bankrupt purchased shares.  He was subsequently charged and convicted with 21 
offences under s 265(1)(a) of the Act for failing to disclose an interest in property – 
ie, the shares - to his trustee in bankruptcy.  These shares had become ‘after-acquired 
property’ and therefore under s 116(1) they were ‘divisible property’ and so required 
disclosure.  
 
Justice Heenan, sitting in the Western Australian Supreme Court, thought this was a 
‘novel question upon which no authoritative determination has been made’.21  
Rodway did not own the shares when he was made bankrupt (had this been the case 
he would have had to include them on his statement of affairs).  He did not come by 
the shares by way of gift or otherwise whilst bankrupt (had this been the case he 
would have had to advise his trustee of his acquisition).  In both these scenarios it is 
clear what is expected of the bankrupt and any breaches are expressly dealt with by 
the offences in Part XIV of the Act.  Rodway purchased these shares while he was a 
bankrupt from income earned post-bankruptcy and before discharge, and which had 
been the subject of income assessments.  This situation is not expressly dealt with in 
the Act.  
 
Before the case there were some certainties.  One of these was that income of the 
bankrupt does not vest in the trustee in bankruptcy.22  This was accepted by both 
sides.23  Rodway was entitled to work, he had earned the money legitimately from 
personal exertion and it had been properly assessed for contributions.  Another of the 
certainties was that shares are property.24  The dispute was whether an item purchased 
with after-acquired income money was (or was not) ‘after-acquired property’, and if it 
                                                 
20 [2009] WASC 201. 
21 Ibid [33]. 
22 Authority for this proposition is Commissioner of Taxation v Official Receiver (1956) 95 CLR 300; 
Falstein v Official Receiver [1962] HCA 65; (1962) 108 CLR 523; Re Gillies ex parte Official Trustee 
in Bankruptcy v Gillies [1993] FCA 289; (1993) 42 FCR 571.  
23 Rodway v White [2009] WASC 201 [32]. 
24 Ibid [30]. 
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was after-acquired property then why had it not been disclosed to the trustee.  
Additionally there was the question of whether the items purchased with after-
acquired income money retained the same excluded or ‘protected’ nature as the 
original income money. 
 
Heenan J acknowledged that ‘there is some incongruity in speaking of after-acquired 
income as not vesting in the trustee yet maintaining that after-acquired property 
(whether acquired with the use of that income or not) does.’25  Yet in the same 
paragraph he states: 
  
The accumulating cash on hand, and the accumulating balance in the bank or other 
account will each be a form of property of the bankrupt from the moment it is paid or 
received. There is no suggestion by the respondents [trustee], nor does the decision in 
Gilles [sic] (supra) appear to contemplate that the proceeds of income, whether it be 
cash or credits in bank accounts, as originally received or accumulated, will constitute 
‘after-acquired’ property within the meaning of s 116.26 
 
Then Heenan J states that ‘[t]his is probably due to the effect of Div 4B and the idea 
that after-acquired property does not include income at least in the form it was 
earned.’27  In obiter, Heenan J contemplates that this income might travel around in 
different bank accounts and that each transition would ‘strictly speaking’ amount to 
an acquisition of property.28  Heenan J resolved this by stating that ‘[t]he 
inconsistencies between this analysis of what constitutes property and the notion of 
‘after-acquired property’ in s 116 can probably be ignored for the present 
notwithstanding that they reveal some special and fundamental changes to the 
conventional notion of “property”.’29  With respect, such an analysis does not do 
justice to the central questions raised in the case.  If Heenan J had been invited to or 
was inclined to analyse an accounting treatment, where cash on hand, cash at bank 
and investments all have a similar position on a balance sheet, then he would not have 
proceeded as he did.   
 
                                                 
25 Ibid [51]. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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Heenan J, after conceding there was a certain degree of awkwardness in identifying 
the after-acquired income as property, decided that the conversion of income into a 
‘distinctly different’ form of property will result in the acquisition of after-acquired 
property divisible among creditors and so vest in the trustee unless the property was 
exempt property.30  He decided therefore that the property should have been disclosed 
to the trustee ‘as soon as practicable’ - as the words of s 77(1)(f) of the Act expressly 
require - and so the offences in s 265(1)(a) were made out.31  Once Heenan J decided 
that the form of property had changed and it was now ‘distinctly different’ then there 
was no real question of ‘protected’ property. 
 
Two cases featured in Heenan J’s considerations and warrant analysis. 
 
2   Peter Andrew Gillies ex parte: The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy; the Trustee of 
the property of Peter Andrew Gillies (‘Gillies’)32  
 
Peter Gillies was a bankrupt who put forward a composition proposal where he 
offered a sum of money that he had accumulated from his income.  He had previously 
paid an income contribution and there was one further payment to be made.  The 
Official Trustee sought the court’s directions on whether this accumulated income 
was after-acquired property and if he purchased assets with this accumulated income 
whether they would also be after-acquired property.  
 
In Gillies, French J (as he then was) reviewed the history of the vesting of property 
and of a bankrupt’s income in excess of that necessary for his support.  French J’s 
judgment also discussed the judicial exposition of the word ‘income’ before 
addressing the contributions provisions as they now stand in the Act.  French J 
records that content of the current sections including ss 139P(1), 139Q, 139L, 139S, 
139U, 139V, 139W , 139ZF, 139ZG, 139ZH, before arriving at ‘the real issue’ in the 
case, namely ‘whether income in excess of the contribution to be made by the 
bankrupt has vested in the trustee’33.  French J observed that there is a ‘continuing 
                                                 
30 Ibid [66]. 
31 Ibid [67], [75]. 
32 [1993] FCA 289; (1993) 42 FCR 571. 
33 Peter Andrew Gillies ex parte: The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy; the Trustee of the property of 
Peter Andrew Gillies [1993] FCA 289; (1993) 42 FCR 571 [10]. 
Submitted to (and first published in) special edition of the QUT Law Review. 
For final, edited version see (2014) 14(3) QUT Law Review 53. 
assumption that the income of the bankrupt does not vest in the trustee’ before further 
stating:   
 
The liability to contribute is limited to half the excess of assessed income over the 
actual income threshold amount. Before it arises, a process of assessment is required 
to be undertaken by the trustee. It is true that the after-acquired property to which 
ss.58 and 116 apply is defined widely enough to encompass income. However, in my 
opinion, the legislative scheme now in place is quite inconsistent with the application 
of those provisions to after-acquired income. This follows from the comprehensive 
scheme embodied in Division 4B which approaches a code for dealing with after-
acquired income of the bankrupt.34 
 
After also observing that the extrinsic materials did not support a different 
interpretation, he decided that the accumulated income could be offered to creditors as 
a composition proposal.35  
 
Finally, in obiter in the last paragraph of the judgment, French J stated: 
 
I am inclined to the view that assets purchased by a bankrupt with after-acquired 
income will, if not within any of the excluded categories in s 116(2), constitute 
property divisible among the creditors and vest in the trustee. In my opinion, 
however, no final decision should be given on this point which is still rather 
hypothetical.36  
 
This judgment identifies that there is a potential problem of after-acquired income 
being converted into property and then being subject to vesting, and tenuously links 
former legislation and case law to the result that property purchased with such income 
becomes divisible property. 
 
3   Sheahan v O’Brien37 
                                                 
34 Ibid [11]. 
35 Ibid [11], [12]. 
36 Ibid [12]. 
37 [2002] FMCA 25. 
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In this case two bankrupts were being pursued for property that they had owned 
during their bankruptcy and on which they had continued to pay the mortgage.  The 
Magistrate, Raphael FM, noted that it was common ground that the payments made 
by the bankrupts were made from income.  The Magistrate referred to the view 
expressed by French J in Gillies that Division 4B of the Act was a code dealing with 
after-acquired income of the bankrupt and that income did not vest in the trustee as 
after-acquired property pursuant to s 58 of the Act.  The Magistrate held that in the 
case of one of the bankrupts, Mrs O’Brien, all the required procedures were complied 
with and a nil assessment was made.  Therefore, to the extent that she can establish 
she had income left over which was applied to maintain and reduce the mortgage, 
then that income is not after-acquired property pursuant to s 58.  
However, the Magistrate held that 
the translation of this exempt income into an equity in the Medindie property 
constitutes an after-acquired property which vests in the trustee pursuant to s 58(1)(b) 
of the Bankruptcy Act and is divisible among the creditors of the bankrupt under s 
116(1)(a).  
 
Raphael FM stated that ‘[p]roviding that income was kept in specie or used for the 
purposes of purchasing assets which fall within s 116(2) then it is not divisible but 
otherwise it would be.’  In doing so he was second guessing French J in Gillies 
musing that as property purchased with after-acquired income was not specifically 
exempted under s 116(2) then it must be divisible.  
 
B   Recent Cases dealing with what constitutes ‘income’ 
 
It is not surprising that throughout the history of Australian bankruptcy law there have 
been a number of cases involving Division 4B of the Act focusing on whether 
particular money received by the bankrupt (or somewhat controlled by him or her), is 
income.  The three cases that follow amply demonstrate the debate.  
 
1   Inspector General on Bankruptcy v McGushin38 
                                                 
38 [2009] FCA 662. 
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Michael McGushin was a surgeon practising in Kalgoorlie and he operated a medical 
practice in which he was the only practitioner.  He was sued for malpractice and 
became bankrupt. In McGushin’s case the earnings of a proprietary company were 
being contested as income derived by the bankrupt even though they were not actually 
received by the bankrupt.  The bankrupt held ten of the eleven shares in the company 
and the trustee was attempting to claim ten elevenths of the net income of the 
company as assessable income.  The bankrupt was already assessed for the income he 
had received.  The company went into liquidation and paid no dividends to 
shareholders. There was no indication that income was being accumulated or dealt 
with (e.g., capitalised) on behalf of the bankrupt.  Justice McKerracher considered ss 
139W, 139L and 139M of the Act and decided that income has to be ‘derived’ in 
order to be relevantly assessable and in this case the bankrupt had not derived the 
income for the purposes of s 139W.39  The funds received by the company after the 
payment of net entitlements to its employee were absorbed by the liquidator.40  
McKerracher J also identified the public interest aspect that  
 
[i]f income does not have to be derived income in order to be relevant assessable, it 
would mean that all bankrupts employed by a third person or entity should 
immediately resign after they become bankrupt because whatever money was 
received by their employer as a result of their labours would constitute their income 
for the purposes of this division of the Bankruptcy Act.41  
 
The judge observed that there was no legislative intention to this effect and that it 
would produce quite an unexpected outcome.42  Of course, the shares owned by 
McGushin vested in the trustee but being shares in an insolvent company, they were 
of little value.   
 
2   Dominic Lawrence Oliveri and Michael Gregory Jones as Trustee of the Bankrupt 
Estate of D L Oliveri43 
 
                                                 
39 Inspector General in Bankruptcy v McGushin [2009] FCA 662 [44]. 
40 Ibid [52]. 
41 Ibid [44]. 
42 Ibid. 
43 [1998] AATA 570. 
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Dominic Oliveri was a solicitor and a bankrupt.  His practice was sold and he 
continued to attend the practice though he was not paid any money.44  He claimed he 
spent the rest of the time preparing for his personal litigation and court appearances.  
The bankrupt’s needs were provided for by his personal partner and friends.  The 
bankrupt applied for a review of his trustee’s assessment (under s 139L of the Act) of 
an estimate of reasonable remuneration of $65,000 per year.  DP McMahon in the 
AAT found that the assessment was made under s 139Y(1) of the Act which permits 
the trustee to determine that the bankrupt receives reasonable remuneration in respect 
of employment, work or activities. 
 
The Deputy President heard evidence of the arrangement made with the purchaser of 
the practice where the new owner would pay the bankrupt $300 per week, as well as 
from the principal of a recruitment agency and managing partner of an unrelated law 
firm to ascertain what a reasonable remuneration would be.  There was no industrial 
award or agreement that prescribed rates or minimum salaries.  McMahon DP 
concluded that 
 
it is necessary to pay some regard to the circumstances of the bankrupt but the test 
ultimately is not to determine what the bankrupt would (or even could) have earned. 
[but] [T]he test to be applied is an objective one, tempered only by such 
considerations that might render an expectation reasonable.45  
 
This was consistent with McMahon DP’s decision in Re Nelson and Inspector 
General in Bankruptcy46 (discussed further below). 
 
3   In the matter of the bankrupt Estate of John Lawrence Sharpe; Re John Lawrence 
Sharpe; ex parte Max Christopher Donnelly47 
 
John Sharpe was a bankrupt barrister.  At the date of his bankruptcy there were 
outstanding fees due for work he had done before his bankruptcy and for which he 
had raised a memorandum of fees.  The court was asked to determine whether the 
                                                 
44 Ibid [12].  
45 Ibid [33]. 
46 (1994) 35 ALD 113. 
47 [1998] FCA 6. 
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barrister’s professional fees due to a bankrupt and outstanding at the date of his 
bankruptcy would constitute income within Division 4B of Part VI of the Act.  The 
Federal Court decided that they would indeed be income and not property that was 
available to pay creditors.  
 
Lockhart J recognised the two different approaches, that of after-acquired income 
vesting in the trustee (except to the extent to which they were required for the support 
of the bankrupt and his family, as found in the UK) and the other approach of leaving 
the income with the bankrupt unless by statutory intervention some of the money 
would be paid over to the trustee for the benefit of his or her creditors.48  He opined 
that the latter approach seemed a “more logical and sensible view.”49 
 
Lockhart J commented on Division 4B of Part VI of the Act: 
 
Although the after-acquired property to which ss 58 and 116 of the Bankruptcy Act 
apply are sufficiently widely defined to include income of the bankrupt, Division 4B 
establishes a comprehensive scheme of dealing with after-acquired income of the 
bankrupt. Where it is inconsistent with sections such as ss 58 and 116, provisions of 
the division must be taken to apply.50  
 
The trustee was held not to be entitled to treat the fees which were the subject of the 
memoranda of fees issued by the bankrupt (and outstanding at the date of his 
bankruptcy) as after-acquired property of the bankrupt.  Despite such a finding, 
Lockhart J held that the trustee should treat the memoranda of fees rendered by the 
bankrupt before the date of his bankruptcy as income derived by the bankrupt after the 
commencement of his bankruptcy and capable of inclusion in the calculation of 
income contribution assessments under Division 4B of Part VI of the Act.51 
   
C   Converting income to capital – UK and NZ perspectives  
on the question in Rodway v White 
 
                                                 
48 Ibid 6.   
49 Ibid 6. 
50 Ibid 7. 
51 Ibid 3 and 8. 
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The UK Insolvency Service Technical Manual (‘UK Technical Manual’)52 addresses 
the same issue which confronted the court in Rodway v White – namely, the treatment 
of non-divisible proceeds which have been converted to another type of property (eg, 
a capital asset).  Chapter 31.8 of the UK Technical Manual provides ‘general advice 
and guidance relating to after-acquired property, including an overview of what does, 
and does not, constitute after-acquired property and the procedure for laying claim to 
after-acquired property.’53  Not unlike the Australian position, the UK Technical 
Manual states that ‘there are certain types of property that would not be claimed as 
after-acquired property, either for statutory reasons … , or because the property is 
more properly classified as income and should, therefore, the claimed under an 
IPA/IPO’ (ie, an income payments agreement or income payments order).54  The UK 
Technical manual states that ‘[w]here damages relating to a personal action are paid 
to the bankrupt during the period of bankruptcy they may only be claimed as after-
acquired property if they were to change character during the period of bankruptcy– 
for example, if they were invested in property, or used to purchase another asset’.55  In 
support of this statement, the UK Technical Manual (which is updated to 13 
September 2013) cites a 19th century authority, In re Wilson ex parte Vine. (‘Vine’s 
case’)56  Vine’s case is also cited in support of another statement in Chapter 31.9 of 
the UK Technical Manual that ‘[m]onies awarded for “personal” elements of a claim 
following litigation or secured in a settlement after the making of the bankruptcy 
order may not be claimed by the official receiver, as trustee, unless those monies 
change character during the period of bankruptcy’.57  
 
As in the UK, in Australia the proceeds of actions (eg, damages) for personal injury or 
wrong to the bankrupt are non-divisible property under s 116 of the Act.58  
Additionally, the Australian statute goes further in expressly providing that any 
property acquired with those non-divisible proceeds shall also be non-divisible 
                                                 
52 The UK Insolvency Service Technical Manual is available online at 
http://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/freedomofinformation/. 
53 UK Insolvency Service Technical Manual, Ch 31 (Realisation of Assets), Introduction [31.8.1]. 
54 Ibid [31.8.32]. 
55 Ibid [31.8.43]. 
56 (1878) LR 8 Ch D 364. 
57 UK Insolvency Service Technical Manual, [31.9.196] citing In re Wilson ex parte Vine (1878) LR 8 
Ch D 364. 
58 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 116(2)(g).   
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property.59  However, as identified above, that provision does not extend to the use of 
exempt income, which leaves property purchased with such income vulnerable to 
characterisation as after-acquired property and divisible among creditors (as per the 
construction of the Act adopted by French J (in obiter) in Re Gillies and by Heenan J 
in Rodway v White. 
 
The judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Vine’s case is brief – the Court 
rejected the attempt of a trustee to lay claim to proceeds of a judgment obtained by an 
undischarged bankrupt who had successfully sued for slander.  The leading judgment 
of James LJ (with whom the other members of the Court concurred) held that the 
trustee was unable ‘to intercept the damages before they reach the bankrupt's hands, 
or to prevent him, if he has got them, from spending them in the maintenance of 
himself and his family.’60  James LJ stated that 
 
an exception [to the divisibility of an undischarged bankrupt’s property among all his 
creditors] was absolutely necessary in order that the bankrupt might not be an outlaw, a 
mere slave to his trustee; he could not be prevented from earning his own living. On that 
principle the trustee could not sue for moneys due to the bankrupt in respect of his 
personal labour, and, if the bankrupt could sue for them only for the benefit of his trustee, 
he would really be without remedy. If he could not sue for damages in respect of a 
personal wrong, such as the seduction of his daughter, or anything like that, the Courts of 
the realm would be closed to him for all practical purposes.61 
 
James LJ made a further obiter statement of principle which for all its brevity appears 
to have demonstrated remarkable resilience during the subsequent 135 years of 
English bankruptcy law:   
 
If the bankrupt had accumulated the money and had invested it in some property, that 
property might be reached by the trustee.62 
 
The obiter of James LJ in Vine’s case appears to constitute the kernel of legal 
principle relating to the ‘changed character’ of non-divisible proceeds – a doctrine 
                                                 
59 The combined operation of ss 116(2)(n), 116(2D) and 116(3) of the Act.  
60 In re Wilson ex parte Vine (1878) LR 8 Ch D 364, 367 (James LJ). 
61 (1878) LR 8 Ch D 364, 366 (James LJ). 
62 Ibid. 
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which currently holds sway in the UK and which has its Australian manifestation in 
the form of the obiter of French J in Re Gillies and the decision of Heenan J in 
Rodway v White.   
 
The relevance of Vine’s case to the question of the effect of a bankrupt’s use of 
exempt proceeds/money to purchase other property was confirmed in the New 
Zealand case of Leach v Official Assignee (Leach).63  Leach could be said to be the 
New Zealand equivalent of Rodway v White and saw the New Zealand court squarely 
address Vine’s case.  In Leach the trustee had realised property which had been 
ultimately acquired by the bankrupt through the use of proceeds of a personal injuries 
claim (for an injury sustained well after the commencement of the bankruptcy).  After 
discharge the former bankrupt sought an order that the trustee account for those 
realisation proceeds.  Not unlike Heenan J in Rodway v White twenty-five years later, 
Cooke J in Leach observed that the case ‘raises a point of principle which it is odd to 
find unsettled.’64  Cooke J set out the issue for determination in much the same terms 
as that which presented the court in Rodway v White: 
 
[I]t is accepted that there is a rule of law preventing the passing to … [the Assignee] 
of a right of action for damages for personal injuries suffered by the bankrupt. 
Likewise it is accepted that the Assignee cannot prevent the bankrupt from spending 
the proceeds of such an action on the maintenance of himself and his family. And it is 
even accepted that as long as the damages or the balance of them retain their identity 
as a fund - for instance, while they remain in a bank deposit account - they cannot be 
touched by the Assignee. But it is contended that once they are invested, whether 
prudently or otherwise, and are represented by such property as shares, debentures, 
land, mortgages or (as here) motorcars, the Assignee is entitled to that property. 
Reliance is placed on an obiter dictum of James LJ in [Vine’s case] ...     
 
Interestingly, Cooke J was referred by counsel to some Australian commentary of the 
day relating to the central point in issue:  
 
[I]n McDonald, Henry and Meek's Australian Bankruptcy Law and Practice (4th ed, 
1968) para 295, the following is said with regard to Vine's case; 
                                                 
63 [1975] 1 NZLR 73. 
64 Ibid 84 (Cooke J). 
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"It has been suggested that a trustee might be able to reach damages 
recovered for personal injury, if the amount recovered was invested in 
property. If the damages are clearly earmarked, it is submitted that the trustee 
cannot reach them even if invested in property."65 
Cooke J ultimately refused to follow the obiter of James LJ in Vine’s case.  Cooke J’s 
reasons for denying the trustee the property acquired by the bankrupt with exempt 
proceeds are worth setting out, as they provide some insightful perspectives for an 
Australian court seeking to correctly construe the Australian statute on this issue:  
 
For the following interrelated reasons I prefer the submission in the Australian 
textbook to the dictum in Vine's case: 
(i) It would seem that the law would be open to the reproach of cynicism if it declared 
on the one hand that the bankrupt's right of action for damages for a personal tort was 
no concern of the Assignee in bankruptcy yet on the other that the Assignee might 
seize the fruits for the benefit of the creditors if the bankrupt was so unwise as to 
convert the damages into some other form of property. 
(ii) Whatever may have been the position when, as in 1878, money values were 
relatively constant, it would be unreasonable to deter the bankrupt from a prudent 
investment intended to preserve the damages against inflation. 
(iii) In the present case and many other cases of damages for personal injuries, the 
sum recovered is intended to compensate for effects likely to last long beyond the 
period (now prima facie three years) of the bankruptcy …  
(v) It is illogical to distinguish between an investment resulting in a chose in action, 
such as debt due from a banker, and an investment resulting in some other form of 
property. 
 
Cooke J held that ‘[t]o prevent an investment passing to the Assignee it would be 
necessary for it to be identified with the damages’ (ie, the originally exempt money or 
proceeds).66   
 
D   An open question of statutory construction – should bankrupts be able to retain 
property bought with their exempt income or proceeds? 
 
                                                 
65 Ibid 86 (Cooke J). 
66 Ibid 88 (Cooke J). 
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In so far as context plays a part in the correct interpretation of a statute, Cooke J’s 
approach in the New Zealand case of Leach bears some reflection by Australian 
courts in the construction of Division 4B of Part VI of the Act.  As expressed by 
English courts in the 19th century, the gist of the principle (or doctrine) favouring the 
bankrupt’s retention of income was that bankrupts should not become ‘slaves’ to their 
trustee or creditors.  Should not this same approach be applied in a modern context?  
According to some financial commentators we are currently living through an era of 
unprecedented (central bank-inspired) ‘financial repression’ effected by monetary 
policies such as long-term, emergency (low) level interest rates intended to discourage 
savings in bank accounts and encourage the investment of cash in a ‘chase for yield’.  
As Cooke J observed in 1974, the value of money in times of inflation (or volatile 
currency fluctuations such as we have today) is not as constant or certain as perhaps it 
was in 1878.  The fact that a UK Technical Manual in 2013 cites an 1878 case as 
authority for the inability of a bankrupt to invest exempt money would bemuse many 
in the general community.    
 
Moving from context and policy to a more technical point of statutory construction, s 
139M(1)(b) of the Act would appear to offer an argument in support of the ability of 
bankrupts to freely convert their exempt income.  Section 139M(1)(b) provides that 
income is taken to be derived by a bankrupt even though it is not actually received by 
the bankrupt because it is ‘reinvested’ or ‘capitalised’.  If Rodway v White is correct 
on the divisibility of income which has changed character to that of an acquired 
(capital) asset, s 139M(1)(b) would appear to be otiose in respect of ‘reinvested’ and 
‘capitalised’ income.  If converted income was truly intended to be divisible (as after-
acquired property) then the references in s 139M(1)(b) to ‘reinvested’ and 
‘capitalised’ income would be altogether unnecessary.  The better view may be that 
Division 4B of Part VI of the Act is intended to be a stand-alone ‘code’ in respect of 
income and its investment or appropriation, such that if income is exempt under the 
parameters of Division 4B then its investment/appropriation is equally exempt from 
the rest of the Act (in particular s 116).   
 
E   Sections 139Y and 139ZL: assessment of ‘reasonable’ income  
and garnishee notices 
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Section 139Y enables a trustee in bankruptcy to ‘assess the bankrupt as having an 
income which is reasonable in light of the actual work or activities carried out by the 
bankrupt.’67  Section 139Y of the Act can be a difficult provision to rationalise in 
terms of its possible outcomes.  This might be partly explained by the fact that the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Bankruptcy Amendment Bill 1991 (which 
established the income contributions regime in Division 4B) appears to sit at odds 
with the precise terms of s 139Y:  
 
Some bankrupts claim not to be in receipt of income, or indeed to be unemployed, but 
their lifestyle and activities are quite inconsistent with such claims. Usually in such 
circumstances, all the income generated by the bankrupt’s activities is channelled into 
another entity … Proposed subsection 139Y(1) is directed principally to a situation 
where the bankrupt claims either that he or she generated a low income from work 
which might otherwise be expected to generate a higher income, or that he or she is 
unemployed, but in fact carries out activities which resemble work and from which 
income is generated.68 (emphasis added) 
 
However, the terms of s 139Y are clear that the provision applies if the bankrupt is 
engaging in work and actually receives remuneration that is less than ‘reasonable 
remuneration’.  Section 139Y is not limited to the situation where a bankrupt claims 
to be receiving less than reasonable remuneration and the trustee has reasonable 
grounds to believe otherwise.69  
 
Pattison v Schiffer70 demonstrates the application of s 139Y in the scenario of a 
bankrupt earning income while ‘employed’ by his trading corporate alter egos.71  In 
Pattison the trustee issued a standard notice of contribution upon the bankrupt under s 
139ZG.  Could the trustee have issued a s 139ZL ‘garnishee notice’ upon the 
bankrupt’s employer companies?  It appears that the Official Receiver cannot issue an 
                                                 
67 Bankruptcy Amendment Bill 1991, Explanatory Memorandum, 86 [25.43]. 
68 Ibid [25.43]-[25.44]. 
69 Unlike s 139Z, which applies where a bankrupt claims not to be likely to derive, or not to have 
derived, any income during an assessment period. In that case, s 139Z empowers the trustee to 
determine that the bankrupt did derive income and also determine the amount of that income. 
70 [2007] FMCA 319.  
71 In Pattison v Schiffer the bankrupt worked in a role which was most closely analogous to that of a 
‘chief engineering executive’ with numerous trading companies.  The bankrupt had also continued to 
act as a director of those companies, in breach of his obligations.   
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income contribution ‘garnishee notice’ under ss 139ZK and 139ZL of the Act unless 
there is an ‘identifiable sum of money owing’.72   
 
Another notable case of a disputed s 139Y assessment is Re Nelson and Inspector-
General in Bankruptcy (Nelson).73  In that case, the bankrupt (a former lawyer who 
had been struck off for disciplinary reasons) was employed in the limited capacity of a 
law clerk with his wife’s legal practice.74  The relationship of the bankrupt and his 
employer caused the trustee in bankruptcy to form the view ‘that the applicant was 
receiving remuneration that was less than might reasonably be expected to be, or to 
have been, received by a person who engaged in similar employment where there was 
no relationship between that person and his or her employer.’75  The bankrupt 
received a gross salary of $21,600 but was assessed for the amount of $35,000 per 
year.76  Ultimately, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal set aside the assessment on 
the basis that ‘the best evidence of what might reasonably be expected to be received 
by a person carrying out … [the bankrupt’s] duties with … [the bankrupt’s]  
background is what … [the bankrupt] now receives.’77  Like Pattison, Nelson 
involved asserted delay and failure on the part of the bankrupt to provide to the trustee 
information about the bankrupt’s property, income or expected income.  
 
While the parallels of Pattison and Nelson are obvious (ie, bankrupts working for a 
related party), both cases highlight the curiosity of a s 139Y assessment – that is, that 
a bankrupt who is actually receiving $ x of income can be assessed by a trustee-in-
bankruptcy to have received $ x+y in income.  Both cases beg the question: from 
what resources was the bankrupt supposed to meet the ultimate liability for the 
contribution (as notified under s 139ZI)?  Under s 139Y, the bankrupt is rendered 
liable to contribute a share of his/her income which both the bankrupt and the trustee 
agree was never actually earned or received.  In Pattison, was it the trustee’s 
expectation that the bankrupt would cause his corporate alter egos to stump up the 
                                                 
72 Re Bond; Ex Parte Bond v Caddy (No.1) (1994) 115 FLR 152 (Seaman J).  The Subdivision I 
garnishee provisions are said to be based upon s 218 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (Cth).   
73 (1994) 35 ALD 113.  
74 The Supreme Court of the ACT (on appeal) had permitted the bankrupt to be employed as a law 
clerk with his wife's practice, subject to strict conditions. 
75Re Nelson and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy (1994) 35 ALD 113, 116 (14) (Dep Pres McMahon) 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid 118 (22).  The Tribunal also held that the assessment should have taken into account the value of 
the use of the bankrupt wife's motor vehicle and her provision of rent-free accommodation. 
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cash required to meet the contribution notice?78  In Nelson, was it the trustee’s 
expectation that upon receipt of the contribution notice the bankrupt law clerk would 
confront his employer wife and ask for a raise?  (Such a scenario might produce 
another novel example of the possible interaction of bankruptcy law and family law!)  
 
Assuming the trustees in both cases made their s 139Y assessments on the basis that 
there was ‘real money’ somewhere behind the bankrupt (or the bankrupt’s 
employment), one might reflect upon whether it is the employer who should be the 
logical recipient of any contribution notice in circumstances where the bankrupt is 
providing services for a lesser amount of remuneration than is considered reasonable.  
How do the garnishee provisions of Division 4B of Part VI the Act sit with the ability 
of trustees to make a s 139Y assessment of income which was not ever actually 
received?  This is explored further below in a practical scenario.  
 
Would a garnishee notice be available (or competent) in respect of the quantum 
meruit claim of a bankrupt who has not received payment of a reasonable amount for 
his/her services?  In Edwards v Australian Securities and Investments Commission79 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that a quantum meruit claim for the 
reasonable value of work done upon request is a ‘debt’ for the purposes of s 588G of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  The court identified a ‘wealth of authority for the 
proposition that a claim for the reasonable value of work done, enforceable by a 
quantum meruit action, is a “debt or liquidated demand” for the purposes of court 
rules conferring procedural advantages on persons suing for debts or making demands 
for liquidated amounts’.80  However, if a bankrupt agrees to work for an employer for 
a ‘below-market’ wage, it would seem unlikely that a trustee-in-bankruptcy can 
somehow step into the shoes of the bankrupt and effectively compel the employer to 
pay a certain level of remuneration.  (Query whether the position might be different if 
the employment relationship was governed by legislative minimum standards or an 
                                                 
78 In Pattison it seems that there was ‘real money’ behind the bankrupt in light of the various 
companies he was managing.  It may have been that the bankrupt had an interest in avoiding a 
prolonged bankruptcy and so would be likely to find the resources to meet the contribution notice 
based on the s 139Y assessment. 
79 (2009) 264 ALR 723. 
80 Edwards v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2009) 264 ALR 723, [81] (Macfarlan 
JA). 
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award.)  Should the Act be amended to allow a primary contribution notice to be 
served upon an employer who is receiving the benefit of cheap or discounted labour?   
 
 
VII   CAN PAY, SHOULD PAY, MAKING THEM PAY 
(BUT AVOIDING SLAVERY) 
A   A few possible scenarios 
So far the discussion has featured the primary sources of income contribution law, the 
case law and legislation which provide that, while undischarged, a bankrupt who has 
income will need to make a contribution to his or her creditors.  It is a system 
designed so that those who can pay should pay.  It is then designed to make them pay. 
The following practical scenarios demonstrate that while a bankrupt remains under 
the relevant threshold he/she is treated fairly under Division 4B of Part VI of the Act.  
However, once over the threshold a bankrupt could be required to hand over ‘after-
acquired property’ as well as make income contributions, whilst a bankrupt in an 
identical position would only be required to make income contributions because of 
their choice of what they do with excess money.  The final scenario considers the 
notion of garnisheeing an income contribution from non-existent income.    
 
1   Scenario One  
Bruce, despite being an undischarged bankrupt, is a frugal man, who works as a 
suburban bus driver and is paid $19 per hour for a 35 hour week ($34,550).  On about 
40 weekends per year he works as a chauffeur and is paid $30 per hour for 10 
weekend hours.  This averages $12,000 per year.  His assessed income is $46,550.  He 
pays $250 per week rent.  He has no dependants.    
 
Bruce would make no income contribution and as he has no money over the threshold 
he is not effected by any loss. In this scenario the application of the legislation 
appears to be fair. Bruce is not expected to pay his creditors an income contribution so 
the ‘can pay, should pay’ approach is workable. 
 
 
2   Scenario Two 
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Cheryl is an undischarged bankrupt and is a frugal woman.  She is employed as a 
payroll supervisor and is paid $65,785. She has no dependents.  Under s 139K of the 
Act, her BITA limit is $52,543.50 which is also hers AITA.81  Under s 139S of the 
Act the amount of income contributions to be paid is $6,620.75.82  She pays $250 per 
week rent.     
 
In the year after Cheryl was made bankrupt she paid her income contribution. During 
that year she put aside a little money each week and accumulated $5000. With this 
money she had saved in a tin at home she buys some listed ‘Q’ shares from an on-line 
broker.  Her trustee takes the shares as after-acquired property on the basis of the 
present law emanating from Rodway v White in conjunction with the Bankruptcy Act.. 
He tells her she is lucky he is not pursuing her for Bankruptcy Act offences. Cheryl 
decides not to save any more money.  
 
3   Scenario Three 
Athol is an undischarged bankrupt and is a frugal man.  He, too is employed as a 
payroll supervisor and is paid $65,785.  He has no dependents.  Under s 139K of the 
Act, his BITA limit is $52,543.40 which is also his AITA.  Under s 139S of the Act, 
the amount of income contributions to be paid is $6,620.75.83  He pays $250 per week 
rent  
 
In each of his three years of bankruptcy Athol pays his income contribution. 
Additionally, in each year that he is bankrupt he puts aside a little money each week 
and it accumulates to $5,000 per year. He puts it in a tin under his bed.  After being 
discharged he takes the $15,000 out of his tin and buys listed ‘Q’ shares from an 
online broker.  He does not disclose this to his trustee. Under the present law Athol 
keeps the money while being bankrupt and is permitted ‘post-bankruptcy’ to convert 
cash into shares. His scenario is identical to Cheryl’s apart from her mistake to 
convert cash to shares during her bankruptcy, a move that produces an unfair result 
between two bankrupts who have both paid the income contribution that the Act 
requires of them.  
                                                 
81 See above n 9. 
82 Calculated under s 139S of the Act as half of the difference between ‘Assessed income’ ($65,785) 
and the AITA ($52,543.50) – ie, half of $13,241.50. 
83 Ibid. 
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4   Scenario Four  
 
Ahmed is an undischarged bankrupt. On the application of a bank, a sequestration 
order was made against Ahmed.  The Official Trustee was appointed as the trustee for 
Ahmed’s estate.  During investigations into Ahmed’s affairs, it came to light that 
Ahmed’s net annual income as declared in his statement of affairs was $32,500.  
However, for the last eight months Ahmed has been employed as a finance officer at a 
medium-sized grocery distributor, on a full-time basis.  Ahmed explained that he is 
still ‘learning the ropes’, and his cousin Mohammed gave him the job out of family 
loyalty after the financial collapse of Ahmed’s previous employer.  Finance officers in 
similar-sized businesses are normally paid around $65,000 (after tax) annually.   
 
Can the Official Receiver provide Mohammed with a s 139ZL ‘garnishee notice’ on 
the basis of an assessment of Ahmed’s ‘reasonable’ level of income under s 139Y? 
 
A ‘reasonable remuneration assessment’ and ‘garnishee notice’ could operate together 
in a scenario where the bankrupt is receiving less than what is considered reasonable 
for his/her work.  In scenario 4 above, Ahmed’s income could be assessed under s 
139Y for the purposes of arriving at an ultimate contribution liability which is not - 
according to the Act’s own thresholds - appropriate for the amount of wages he 
actually receives each week.  The debt obligation of Mohammed to pay Ahmed’s 
inadequate salary (whatever it is) could legitimately be the subject of a garnishee 
notice under s 139ZL in respect of Ahmed’s contribution liability calculated on the 
basis of a s 139Y assessment.  This would appear to be a harsh outcome for Ahmed in 
that his wages are garnisheed by reference to an assessed level of remuneration which 
he never actually enjoys.  Ahmed might ask Mohammed for a raise but Mohammed 
may, of course, reject such a request.  It would be interesting to know if any of these 
considerations are (or should be) relevant to the exercise of the trustee’s discretion to 
make a s 139Y assessment. 
     
B   Voluntary contributions 
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Section 139P(2)  of the Act provides that if the income during the assessment period 
is ‘under the original assessment’ and not exceeding the actual income threshold 
amount then the bankrupt ‘may if he or she so wishes’ pay to the trustee a 
contribution.  There is limited information available about this voluntary contribution.  
It was inserted into the Act in 1992.  Presumably, the provision was placed in the Act 
to cater for those bankrupts who feel that they have a moral obligation to pay their 
debts, despite their bankrupt status. 
 
Four questions are worth pursuing;  
 How much is collected for distribution to creditors from voluntary 
contributions and how much of the amount collected actually is distributed? 
 Since its introduction have there been any behavioural changes to suggest that 
bankrupts in 2014 are more or less inclined to make voluntary contributions? 
 What is the motivation for those bankrupts who do make a voluntary 
contribution?  What profiles do such bankrupts exhibit?  
 Should the voluntary contribution mechanism exist or continue in its current 
form?   
At present these questions remain un-researched and therefore unanswered. 
 
C   Calculating the contribution payable by the bankrupt 
 
Section 139S of the Act provides a formula for the contribution that a bankrupt is 
liable to pay in respect of a contribution assessment period.  The Act uses two 
important phrases: ‘Assessed income’ and ‘Actual income threshold amount’.  Do 
these phrases and the formula work?  
 
1   A sliding scale 
The income assessment calculation which incorporates dependents could be further 
refined to address both the creditors’ interests in receiving more from the bankrupt’s 
income and the bankrupt’s interests in having an incentive to work and recover 
financially, by introducing a sliding scale much like the progressive, marginal income 
tax system.  While the ‘flat rate’ of 50% in the current s 139S formula applies 
regardless of the size of the income, other percentage rates could apply for higher 
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incomes.  For example, consideration could be given to bankrupts whose incomes 
exceed twice the threshold (ie, incomes of more than $105,086.80) being required to 
pay a higher contribution rate of, say, 55% and those whose incomes are at three 
times the threshold (ie, $157,630.20) contributing at an even higher rate of 60%.   
 
2   Compensation for lack of homestead exemption 
When a bankrupt has to pay rent or a mortgage because there is no home exemption 
then should an adjustment be made for their contribution?  Section 139T of the Act 
permits bankrupts to apply in writing if they are living in rented accommodation for a 
determination that may alleviate such hardship.  Perhaps a discount could be factored 
in for any mortgage a bankrupt pays before contribution.  Perhaps the rent a bankrupt 
pays could be ‘automatically’ assessed rather than requiring a determination.  
Assessed income could be reduced by the average rental payable for the capital city 
nearest to the bankrupt.  Currently, rents are mostly cheaper in country areas which 
means that bankrupts who live in those areas have more to live on compared with 
‘city bankrupts’ who have to pay higher rent (or mortgage instalments) and also make 
their required contribution.  Arguably though, the costs of travel and food may be 
higher in country areas which might offset the cheaper ‘shelter’ costs.  
 
The consideration of shelter expenses is relevant given that house mortgage payments 
do not feature in income tax assessment.  Section 139N of the Act permits the 
assessed income to be reduced by amounts payable in respect of income tax. Again, it 
would seem to address the goal of fairness if city and country bankrupts were treated 
according to their circumstances for housing as it is such a large expense. 
 
3   Is the base solid? 
The basic income threshold amount (‘BITA’) is increased by the number of 
dependants to provide the actual income threshold amount (‘AITA’).  This is defined 
in s 139K.  Should there be other factors beyond the number of dependants which 
require an adjustment to the BITA?  At present the BITA is ‘3.5 times the amount 
that, at that time, is specified in column 3, item 2, Table B, point 1064-B1, Pension 
Rate Calculator A in the Social Security Act 1991’.  BITA is therefore linked to the 
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) but should it be closer linked to other indicators such 
as the minimum wage? 
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D   Fixing the Rodway v White outcome 
The most obvious solution to the inappropriate situation of having law which is not 
readily understood and ‘accessible’ would be to have s 116(2) of the Act expressly 
provide that all property purchased with after-acquired income becomes ‘exempt’.  
This would be an expansion of the current concept of exempting property purchased 
with ‘protected money’ within the terms of ss 116(2D) and 116(2)(n) of the Act.   
 
Alternatively, the legislation could identify what is exempt from becoming ‘after-
acquired property’.  For example, it could expressly exempt shares, making them 
exempt property under s 116(2) (or Reg 6.03A) if they were purchased with after-
acquired income beyond the contribution thresholds.  The legislation could even add 
an extra dimension to the meaning of ‘income’ - as provided by s 139L(1) - to include 
the proceeds of dividends from shares purchased with after-acquired income beyond 
the threshold.  The meaning of ‘exempt property’ could be expanded to include in the 
threshold voluntary mortgage payments made during the bankruptcy, albeit, after the 
income contribution has been paid.  Again, the terms of s 116(2)(v) - which provides 
that ‘the amount of money a bankrupt holds in an RSA’ is not divisible among 
creditors - could be extended to ‘amounts added to these accounts from after-acquired 
income beyond the contribution threshold’.  There may be other items of property 
which could also rate an express mention in an amended s 116(2).  These legislative 
changes would avoid any further development (or argument) of the jurisprudence 
commenced in Rodway v White where Heenan J introduced the requirement of 
exploring whether the after-acquired income had become ‘distinctively different’.84   
 
If it is viewed that after-acquired income beyond the contribution threshold is best 
moved to the estate to distribute to creditors, then this could be legislated for by 
allowing a resolution of creditors on the matter.  In the same vein as ss 116(2)(b), (ba) 
and (c) of the Act which permit the bankrupt to retain certain (prescribed) property 
identified by a resolution of creditors, investment purchases from after-acquired 
income could be subjected to similar treatment.     
 
VIII  CONCLUSION 
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Contribution from a bankrupt’s income towards the creditors is a sound idea.  For 22 
years Australia has permitted trustees to make an assessment and required bankrupts 
to contribute without the court directing the amount.  Creditors have benefited from 
such legislation and its accompanying jurisprudence.  The history and theoretical 
framework is informative and the current statistics suggest it is workable law.  This 
article has identified potential areas of further enquiry to assure stakeholders that what 
presently exists is not only efficient but also just.     
 
Compelling bankrupts to make income contribution can be seen as a punishment.  
Some bankrupts will continue to be employed and should be encouraged for ‘good’, 
responsible behaviour.  Therefore, legislation must be fair and balanced so that such 
bankrupts have no reason to complain and/or choose to work less to avoid paying half 
of their earnings to their creditors. 
 
The notions of ‘after-acquired’ income and property and ‘converted income’ need 
further clarification to avoid the Rodway v White situation and provide certainty for 
bankrupts. Bankrupts need clarity on what is required to be disclosed from monies 
that they have which are surplus to the contribution assessment.  The potential for a 
repeat of the ‘triple penalty’ on industrious, frugal bankrupts – ie, where they pay an 
income contribution, lose property purchased from after-acquired income which is 
otherwise beyond the contribution threshold, and commit offences for non-disclosure 
of property - must be removed. 
 
One final reflection: in Kenya discharged bankrupts have to lodge a report 12 months 
after discharge showing their property and income situation so that there can be a 
review of property acquired subsequent to discharge.85  In such a regime even Athol, 
[in Scenario Three above] would be subject to losing his recently acquired, post-
bankruptcy shares!  
 
The success of Division 4B of Part VI of the Act is critical to Australian bankruptcy 
law striking the right balance of avoiding the economic and financial repression of 
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bankrupts while also recognising legitimate community expectations of reciprocal 
responsibility – ie, that income-earning bankrupts should make a reasonable 
contribution to their creditors as a quid pro quo for their financial ‘clean slate’ or 
fresh start.  For that reason, a critical review and refinement of Australia’s income 
contribution regime for bankrupts is timely. 
 
POSTSCRIPT 
Just prior to going to press, the authors noted with interest a July 2014 Federal Court 
decision which addressed some of the very issues canvassed above.  In Di Cioccio v 
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2014] FCA 782 Pagone J had to determine whether 
shares purchased by a bankrupt were ‘after-acquired property’ when the shares were 
purchased with savings from income which fell below the threshold amount for 
contributions.  In short, Pagone J held that there was ‘not a sufficient reason to depart 
from the view expressed in Re Gillies and applied in Rodway v White.’ However, his 
Honour did observe that the outcome for the bankrupt ‘may seem harsh’ and that the 
prevailing construction of the relevant provisions of the statute ‘may appear to operate 
in tension with the policy in Division 4B.’  In the authors’ view, Pagone J’s judgment 
reinforces the need for clarification of the situation by legislative amendment.   
 
 
